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UTAH, 
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Case No. 141.41 
PLAINTIFF'S BRIE!' 
Appeal from a decision by the Board 0£ ·•. 
Industrial Commission of ~' 
PLOYD G. ASTIN 
Special Assistant 
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Department of Employment Security 
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84147 
'lttorney for Defendant-
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"-.··' 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
BURTON DENBY, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. Case No. 14841 
THE BOARD OF REVIEW OF THE 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF 
UTAH, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a decision by the Board of 
Review, Industrial Commission of Utah, denying unemployment 
compensation benefits to Plaintiff on the grounds that he 
voluntarily left his employment without good cause and sub-
sequently was unavailable for work. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff seeks reversal of Defendant's decision and 
the award of benefits from March 21, 1976, until Plaintiff 
is otherwise ineligible. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff was employed by the United States Postal 
Service in Salt Lake City until February 13, 1976, when he 
. . · y which 
terminated his employment due to an on-the-Job inJur ' 
aggravated his arthritis and rendered him unable to perform 
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all of his duties. Plaintiff then returned to his home town 
of Fallon, Montana, to live on a family ranch. He applied 
for unemployment benefits in Montana and began searching for 
work in the area around Fallon. He was disqualified for 
four weeks beginning March 21, 1976, on the grounds of 
voluntary leaving without good cause and denied benefits indef-
initely on the grounds of unavailability for work. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT HAS INCORRECTLY DISQUALIFIED PLAINTIFF ON 
THE GROUNDS THAT HE LEFT WORK WITHOUT GOOD CAUSE, 
SINCE THERE IS NOT SUBSTANTIAL COMPETENT EVIDENCE 
TO SUPPORT SUCH A CONCLUSION. 
This Court's review is limited to deciding whether 
there is "substantial competent evidence to sustain the 
findings and decision of the Appeals Referee and the Board 
of Review." Martinez v. Board of Review, 25 U.2d 131, 477 
P.2d 587,588 (1970). In the present case, a variety of 
deficiencies in the proceedings render Defendant's final 
decision unsustainable. 
The applicable statute, U.C.A. §35-4-lO(e), authorizes 
the Commission to regulate the specific procedures for 
hearings and states that these regulations need not conform 
to the rules of evidence. The specific regulation involved 
here, Regulation 4(b) (1), Appeals to an Appeals Referee of 
the Department of Employment Security Rules and Regulations 
(October 1, 1974), states: 
-2-
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All hearings shall, after due notice to the part· T 
be conducted informally and in such manner as t ies, 
ascertain and protect the rights of the partieso Al 
' 1 . 1 issues re evant to the appeal shall be considered 
and passed upon. 
The fundamental defect in the present case is that 
voluntary leaving under Utah Code Annotated §35-4-5 (a) was 
considered at the hearing. The notice of the hearing (R.OOI: 
states the issue to be considered: "To determine if the 
Claimant is fully available for work and actively seeking 
within the meaning of the law," referring to Utah Code 
Annotated §35-4-4 (c) . The issue was similarly framed in the 
Montana Appeals Referee's opening remarks. (R.0017) These 
statements do not constitute "due notice" and "consideration 
of all the issues." While several of the Referee's question: 
dealt with Plaintiff's employment at the Postal Service a~ 
his leaving, none focused on the crucial element of good 
cause for the leaving. Furthermore, all the testimony 
relevant to good cause is wholly favorable to Plaintiff a~ 
was not considered by Defendant. 
Instead, Defendant has relied solely on a report obtaine: 
from the employer "relative to the reason for separation," 
(R.0012) which is not part of the record. Apparently t~ 
report states that Plaintiff's retirement was based on 
physical problems, and it was unclear whether Plaintiff h~ 1 
requested an exemption from overtime work. (R. 0013) Defendant 
· p lai' ntiff' rather has relied only on this report to penalize 
Whi. ch substantiate' than relying on Plaintiff's own testimony, 
t Ila 
Plaintiff's claim. This Court has repeatedly stated tha 
finding cannot be based wholly upon hearsay evidence" ~ 
-3- I 
• 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Hackford v. Industrial Commission, 11 U. 2d 312, 358 P.2d 
89 9,901(1961). The report relied upon here is clearly 
inadmissible hearsay according to the Rules of Evidence of 
the supreme Court of Utah. Therefore Defendant's decision 
is not supported by any competent evidence and as a matter 
of law must be reversed. 
Moreover, the evidence establishes that Plaintiff did 
have good cause to leave work, and therefore he should not 
have been disqualified. Defendant's General Rules of 
Adjudication, Voluntary Leaving §210, state: 
In considering the reasonableness of a worker's 
leaving work, it may be necessary to measure his 
actions by what a reasonable worker might do under 
similar circumstances. 
Defendant has properly promulgated these rules and is bound 
by them. Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199 (1974). Applying 
this "reasonable worker" standard, Plaintiff's leaving was 
for good cause. He testified that the job had "extreme 
tensions and pressures, people passout, heart attacks, 
nervous breakdwons ..•. " (R.0019) He further testified: 
Q: Did the arthritis affect you on the job? 
A: Oh, very uncomfortable - painful when I was on 
these pills, my employers didn't know it but 
these pills affected my ability in some ways .••• 
Take those pills heavily it's kind of dulling 
to your mind •.•. (R.0020) 
In a statement to a Montana Department representative, 
Plaintiff asserted: 
The job was becoming increasingly difficult for me 
both psychologically and physically due to mandatory 
overtime work. I was unable to continue under the 
circumstances. (R. 0013) 
-4-
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In his appeal statement Plaintiff affirmed: 
Many of the Postel Service die from heart attacks 
and nervous breakdowns, before reaching retireme t 
age, due to pressure and tension. I wished to a~ . , 
this and continue living. (R. 0013) 010 
Given these circumstances, including Plaintiff's advanced 
age of 64, his choice to leave was based on good cause a~ 
is clearly reasonable upon consideration of the record asa 
whole. 
Finally, Defendant's conclusions of lack of good cause 
for leaving dealt with the lack of medical evidence ~ 
substantiate Plaintiff's medical problems and the mandatory 
overtime work as partial basis for leaving. Again, Defendar.: 
has failed to follow its own rules, by which it is bound, 
specifically General Rules of Adjudication, Voluntary Leavir.,: 
§235.25, Illness or Injury: 
Reasonableness should be the rule in assisting the 
claimant to provide his proof. In all cases he 
should be assisted with a detailed written description 
of the nature of his defect, its effect on his work 
or of the work on his health and his ability to 
continue working. In addition, a physician's statement 
should be suggested as further proof. 
In the instant case, the record does not reflect that 
any such assistance was ever rendered. In fact Plaintiff on 
his own asserted that Dr. Lamb, an orthopedic specialist, 
and the Personnel Section of the Salt Lake Post office coulc 
provide further documentation of his medical problems, yet 
to assist Plair.L' Defendant, having made no effort whatsoever 
then at tempted in providing proof of his medical problems, 
to bolster its position by this situation. 
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As to the overtime issue, Defendant draws a totally 
unwarranted inference from the hearsay employer information. 
The person submitting the report indicated a lack of information 
as to whether Plaintiff even qualified for an exemption from 
overtime. (R.0013) Plaintiff stated in his appeal letter 
that to the best of his knowledge overtime was mandatory. 
He further stated that he was not aware of any possible 
exceptions to the mandatory overtime and that this was the 
subject of union-management negotiations at the time. (R.0033) 
From this evidence, Defendant somehow concludes that Plaintiff 
did not have good cause for leaving work. Yet there is no 
substantial competent evidence to support such a conclusion, 
and it should be reversed. 
POINT II 
DEFENDANT HAS INCORRECTLY DENIED PLAINTIFF BENEFITS 
ON THE GROUNDS THAT HE HAS BEEN UNAVAILABLE FOR WORK, 
SINCE THERE IS NOT SUBSTANTIAL COMPETENT EVIDENCE 
TO SUPPORT SUCH A CONCLUSION. 
The standard to be applied in determining availability 
for work was set forth by this Court in Gocke v. Wiesley, 
18 U.2d 245,249,420 P.2d.44,46 (1966): 
It is our duty to examine the record and to affirm 
the decision unless v. e can say as a matter of law 
that the conclusion on the question of "available 
for work" was wrong because only the opposite conclusions 
could be drawn from the facts. 
The Court then stated, "The claimant must act in good faith 
ana make an active and reasonable effort to secure employment." 
More recently this Court has stated that the test is "reasonable-
ness under the circumstances." Lauder v. Board of Review of 
Industrial Comm., 29 U.2d 121,506 P.2d 50,51 (1973). 
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l 
In Gocke, the Court reversed the Board and held 
--- · · the 
claimant entitled to benefits based on the reasonablene . 
SS Gi 
her search for work. In that case, the claimant personally 
applied to her previous employer and to one other 
employer, 
called several other employers, and answered some newspaper 
advertisements. These contacts were held reasonable u~~ 
the circumstances in a large metropolitan area, Salt Lake 
City. In the instant case, Plaintiff has been continuously 
registered with the Job Service office in Miles city, Monta:, 
48 miles west of his home in Fallon; personally contacted a 
construction company in Glendive, Montana, 26 miles east of 
Fallon; personally contacted two bars in Fallon and Terry, 
Montana, 11 miles west of Fallon; and personally contacted a 
farm chemical company in Fallon. Plaintiff has applied for 
as a clerical worker, bartender, salesman, and commercial 
gardener. (R. 0011, 0021-23) Despite this detailed testimony, 
Defendant concludes, "Claimant will travel as far as Terry, 
Montana, population of 1,400 ..•. " (R.0014) This is a clear!: 
erroneous conclusion not supported by any evidence. 
Rather, Plaintiff, aware that he has moved to a small 
town, has liberally defined the area in which he will work: 
from 50 miles west of his residence to 26 miles east, enco~· 
passing four towns with a combined population of over 20 / QLJLJ1 
and has stated his willingness to accept any suitable work 
given his physical problems, even work in which he has no 
background. (R. 0014) Surely this effort cannot be charac· 
terized as "passive and unreasonable." Plaintiff has under· 
h · circum-taken a reasonable search for employment under is 
stances in rural Montana just as did Mrs. Gocke in her 
-7-
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search in Salt Lake City. And like Mrs. Gocke, he should be 
awarded benefits,since the record clearly establishes that 
as a matter of law, the claimant was available for work, 
having met the "reasonableness" test outlined above. 
CONCLUSION 
As there is neither substantial evidence to support 
disqualification of Plaintiff on the grounds of voluntary 
leaving without good cause nor to support denial of benefits 
to Plaintiff on the grounds of unavailability for work, 
these decisions should be reversed. Judgment should be 
entered that as a matter of law Plaintiff is entitled to 
unemployment compensation benefits from March 21, 1976, 
until he is otherwise ineligible. 
1977. 
Respectfully submitted this ~day of ~c~J-~n=t¥~W6-~i"-t-lj~~~~~ 
UTAH LEGAL SERVICES, INC. 
By UHl-1 [b1ll1vvt15 
LUCY BILLINGS 
216 East Fifth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
CERTIFICl,TE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I mailed copies of the foregoing 
Plaintiff's Brief to Floyd G. Astin, Special Assistant 
Attorney General, Industrial Commission of Utah, Department 
of Employment Security, 174 Social 
/ 
City, Utah 84147, this ~~day of 
1977. 
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